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CRIMINAL LAW - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - PRIOR CON-
VICTION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER RESULTING IN
A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT HELD TO BE
AN IMPLIED ACQUITTAL OF THE DEATH PENALTY
ON A RETRIAL SECURED ON DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
People v. Henderson (Cal. 1963).
Defendant, charged with first degree murder, waived trial by jury
and pleaded guilty to the crime as charged. The court imposed a
penalty of life imprisonment. Defendant appealed on the ground
that his conviction was improper since he had been allowed to plead
guilty without the benefit of legal counsel. The District Court of
Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new
trial. In the subsequent jury trial defendant was again convicted of
first degree murder and the penalty fixed at death. On automatic
appeal to the Supreme Court of California one of defendant's nu-
merous contentions was that the imposition of the death sentence
after an appeal from a conviction carrying a penalty of life impris-
onment violated the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
double jeopardy. Reversing on the ground that the trial court failed,
on its own motion, to instruct the jury as to the defense of dimin-
ished responsibility the court further stated in considering the de-
fense of double jeopardy that in light of the basic purpose of the
state constitution the prohibition against double jeopardy precluded
imposition of the death sentence under such conditions. People v.
Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
The doctrine of double jeopardy is deeply ingrained in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. The fifth amendment to the Constitution
provides: "[Njor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ..... " Each of the states
has incorporated a similar clause into its system of laws.1 The Cali-
fornia Constitution includes a provision: "No person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense; . "...2
In its simplest form double jeopardy is a second prosecution for
the same offense,' and may arise when an accused is actually put to
trial twice for the same crime.' Normally legal jeopardy attaches in
a criminal prosecution when the accused has been put to trial upon
a valid, written accusation, before a court of competent jurisdiction,
after arraignment, and after a competent jury has been empanelled
I DANGEL, CIUMINAL LAw 348 (1951).
2 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.




and sworn, or a judge lawfully sitting without a jury has begun to
hear evidence.5
A verdict of not guilty operates as an acquittal of the crime
charged and of every other offense of which the defendant could
have been convicted on the original charge.' A similar rule applies
to a conviction since it constitutes a bar to a subsequent prosecution
for the same crime, or for any other crime of which the defendant
could have been convicted on the same charge at the prior trial.'
However, where on motion or appeal of the accused' a new trial is
secured, the defense of former jeopardy is considered to have been
waived, and the defendant may again be tried for the same crime.'
Despite the latter rule, the majority of jurisdictions hold that in such
a case the defendant has not waived the defense of double jeopardy
as to crimes of a magnitude greater than the crime of which the
defendant was originally convicted."0 In such a case the theory is
that there has been an implied acquittal of all greater crimes of
which the accused could have been convicted on the original trial."
Under California law prior to the 1958 California Supreme Court
decision in Gomez v. Superior Court" a conviction of a lesser offense
(as distinguished from a conviction of a lesser degree of an offense
divided into degrees) barred prosecution upon a trial de novo for
the greater offense charged, even though the first conviction had
been set aside or reversed at defendant's request. The leading Cali-
fornia case is People v. Gilmore" in which the defendant was in-
dicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter. The conviction
was set aside upon the defendant's motion. Upon retrial he was con-
victed of murder. The second conviction was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that a conviction of manslaughter is in contemplation
of law an acquittal of every offense charged in the indictment of a
5 Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 350, 74 P.2d 243 (1937); 14 CAL. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law 175 (1954).
6 People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467 (1869).
SE.g., Cal.. PEN. CODE §§ 654, 1023, People v. Kehoe, 33 Cal. 2d 711, 204 P.2d
321 (1949); Smith v. United States, 177 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1949).-
8 California provides for an automatic appeal in all cases resulting in a penalty of
death. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1239.
9 People v. Ham Tong, 155 Cal. 579, 102 Pac. 263 (1909); People v. Scales, 18
Ill. 2d 283, 164 N.E.2d 76 (1960).
13 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1958);
See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 272 (1961).
" Green v. United States, supra note 10. In a minority of jurisdictions if a new
trial is obtained at defendant's request the entire case is thrown open as if there
had been no previous trial. The theory is that the defendant has waived the de-
fense of double jeopardy completely, or alternatively, that the new trial is merely a
continuation of the original action. For a compilation of citations of cases fol-
lowing the foregoing rules, Green v. United States, supra at 216-18 n.4 ,(dissent-
ing opinion).
12 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 916 (1958).
's 4 Cal. 376 (1854).
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magnitude greater than the particular crime of which the prisoner
was found guilty.".
However, in People v. Keefer" where the court considered the
issue of whether a defendant could be convicted of murder in the
first degree after having appealed from a conviction of murder in
the second degree, the court did not adopt the Gilmore rule of im-
plied acquittal. In the Keefer case the original conviction was not
considered a bar to a subsequent conviction of murder in the first
degree. To achieve this result the court distinguished between lesser
included crimes as opposed to lesser degrees of a crime divided into
degrees. People v. Haun was cited as authority for the distinction
which was presumably intended by the Legislature when it created
two degrees of murder. The Keefer court, relying on Haun, offered
the following interpretation of legislative intent:
[TJhe legislature recognized the fact that some murders, compre-
hended within the same general definition, are of a less cruel and
aggravated character than others, and deserving of less punish-
ment. It did not attempt to define the crime of murder anew, but
only to draw certain lines of distinction by reference to which the
jury might determine, in a particular case, whether the crime de-
served the extreme penalty ofthe law or a less severe punishment.' 7
Expanding on this doctrine the Keefer court continued:
The fact that a severer [sic] penalty is to be imposed in one case
than the other does not change the effect of a previous conviction,
and the defendant who, on his own motion, secures a new trial,
subjects himself to a retrial on the charge of murder, whether the
first verdict was guilty of the first or of the second degree. At the
second trial he may, if the evidence justifies such verdict, be found
guilty of murder of the first degree.18
The Keefer case by distinguishing the Gilmore rule created a
unique distinction in California law, a distinction which was fol-
lowed'9 and enlarged upon until the Gomez decision was rendered.
The distinction created was simply that as between lesser included
offenses and lesser degrees of a crime divided into degrees, the doc-
trine of implied acquittal would apply only to convictions of the
former class.
The rationale of the Keefer court can be clarified by an examina-
tion of the wording of the constitutional provision dealing with
14 Ibid.
25 65 Cal. 232, 3 Pac. 818 (1884).
1o 44 Cal. 96 (1872).
1 65 Cal. at 235, 3 Pac. at 820.
18 Id. at 235, 3 Pac. at 821.
19 People v. Dye, 130 Cal. App. 522, 20 P.2d 358 (1933).
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double jeopardy. Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution pro-
vides: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense; .... " In construing this phrase the term "offense" has been
judicially declared to mean the identity of the crime charged, and
not the act by which, or the transaction in which, the crime was
committed."0 Viewing the crime of murder in light of this interpre-
tation, the courts found that the intent of the Legislature in dividing
the crime into two degrees was not to re-define the crime of murder
but, rather, was merely to provide a guide for the jury in determin-
ing culpability.' The crime of murder remained a single offense:
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.
Therefore, after a conviction of a lesser degree of a crime divided
into degrees it was deemed proper upon a trial de novo to allow a
conviction of any degree of the crime since the crime still constituted
in contemplation of law only one offense.2 One of the many prob-
lems inherent in such a differentiation is the difficulty encountered
in distinguishing between a lesser included offense and a lesser de-
gree of a crime divided into degrees. In many cases such a fine dis-
tinction could mean on appeal the difference between risking several
years imprisonment or one's life.23
A collateral problem is the application of the doctrine of implied
acquittal to cases where significantly differing penalties are provided
as punishment for the same crime.2 This issue was first raised in
California in 1907 when the California Supreme Court, following
the reasoning of the Keefer case, held in People v. Grill" that a
defendant appealing from a conviction of first degree murder which
carried a penalty of life imprisonment could be sentenced to death
upon a retrial gained by his initiative. In support of its holding the
court said:
The discretion given to the jury to mitigate the punishment upon
a conviction of murder in the first degree, and inflict imprisonment
for life only, does not divide .... that degree of murder into two
degrees, but merely reduces the punishment.... The former con-
viction was not an acquittal of the first degree of murder nor of
any degree thereof.
2 6
20 People v. Brannon, 70 Cal. App. 225, 233 Pac. 88 (1924).
21 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 187, 189, People v. Coston, 84 Cal. App. 2d 645, 191 P.2d
521 (1948).
22 People v. McNeer, 14 Cal. App. 2d 22, 57 P.2d 1018 (1936).
23 People v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907) (defendant sentenced to death
after appeal from convication carrying life sentence).
24 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 190 provides life imprisonment or death as penalties for
first degree murder.
25 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907). Keefer relies on People v. Haun for its inter-
pretation of legislative intent whereas Grill cites no authority but expresses the
same view.
26 151 Cal. at 598, 91 Pac. at 517.
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Although the Grill court disclaimed any express reliance on the
Keefer line of cases, it is apparent that its holding is, nevertheless,
consistent with and impliedly dependent upon the reasoning in
Keefer.
In 1958 in Gomez v. Superior Court" the California Supreme
Court was confronted with the first of the two latent problems cre-
ated by its theretofore unchallenged position."8 The issue presented
in Gomez was whether or not petty theft was a lesser included of-
fense within, or a lesser degree of, the crime of grand theft. Faced
with the necessity of making an arbitrary distinction, the court chose
to abrogate the rule which made the distinction necessary. In over-
ruling itself the court relied heavily upon the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Green v. United States.20 There, a
divided Court held that a defendant convicted by a jury of second
degree murder could not be retried on the original charge of first
degree murder after a successful appeal because to do so would
place him in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the
fifth amendment of the federal constitution. In considering the im-
plications of a contrary rule the Court remarked:
[A] defendant faced with such a 'choice' takes a 'desperate chance'
in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law
should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in
such an incredible dilemma3 0
The Gomez court, accepting this rationale, rejected the arguments of
the prosecution and stated that there was no sound reason for the
distinction drawn by the California cases since neither the state con-
stitution nor the statutes required it."' Since Gomez eliminated what
had become a spurious distinction, the court was no longer com-
pelled to apply that rationale in determining the collateral issue of
implied acquittal in cases involving significantly differing penalties
for the same offense.
Since the doctrine of implied acquittal is now the accepted rule in
cases of both lesser included crimes and crimes of lesser degree, the
Henderson court had no sound basis upon which to hold otherwise
in considering the penalty issue. The court followed the rationale of
Gomez and applied the doctrine of implied acquittal to the penalty
issue and in holding that the defendant was twice placed in jeopardy
by a second conviction carrying the death sentence stated:
27 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958).
28 There is a paucity of dissenting opinions in the California cases dealing with this
subject.
'29 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
30 Id. at 193.
31 50 Cal. 2d at 647, 328 P.2d at 981.
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A defendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment is un-
reasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke
that right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous
judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by
imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to'appeal.
32
Although the Henderson court achieved a reasonable result in
light of the Gomez rationale, in doing so it necessarily extended the
legislative intent by establishing what seems to be two grades of first
degree murder: (1) an atrocious, sordid crime committed for per-
sonal profit or by an habitual criminal, justifying the imposition of
the death penalty, and (2) murder without the vicious elements
which characterize (1) and therefore justifying the imposition of a
penalty of life imprisonment only."
Such an extension of legislative intent could have far-reaching
implications in California penal law. A series of decisions firmly
establishing an additional division of the crime of first degree mur-
der by judicial fiat would probably necessitate legislative considera-
tion of the propriety of such a fractionization.
The creation of a new offense within the crime of first degree
murder necessitates a re-examination of the justification for applying
a particular penalty. If such a division, based primarily upon ex-
press considerations of culpability and elements of atrociousness, is
to be created, reason dictates that the death penalty be limited to the
higher of the two grades of first degree murder. Such a limitation,
whether based upon case law or upon statute, would be consistent
with the application of the implied acquittal doctrine espoused in
the Henderson decision. The fundamental principle upon which the
Henderson decision is based is simply that a conviction entailing
imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment is by implication a
finding by the trier of fact that the offense is devoid of some element
warranting the death penalty. Would it not be logical to apply this
concept to the penalty issue in the original trial and thereby distin-
guish from the outset the factual basis upon which the conviction
and penalty rest? By establishing such a doctrine either judicially or
legislatively and requiring the trier of fact to be governed by its
provisions from the outset, the death penalty and the factors upon
which its imposition depends could be expressly passed upon by the
trier of fact and would thereby become tangible, positive elements
capable of definitive proof and overt defense. Such a requirement
32 60 Cal. 2d at 497, 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
q3 See 38 Dicic. L. REV. 276. This conclusion does not necessarily follow from the
decision in Henderson, but rather, is drawn by implication. The distinguishing
elements noted are merely illustrative, and do not reflect any absolute finding, nor
preclude distinction based on other grounds.
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would undoubtedly remove much of the aura of uncertainty which
now surrounds the role of the trier of fact in determining the im-
position of the death penalty. If the death penalty is to be retained
it should be made a consequence of definite acts and circumstances,
rather than a matter to be determined by the trier of fact by means
of some ethereal, intuitive sense of justice.
The implications of the Henderson decision not only illuminate
the existence of a fundamental problem in California penal law,
but also supply the impetus for its ultimate solution. The apparent
creation of two grades of first degree murder affords an opportunity
for a complete redefinition of the crime of first degree murder and
its attendant penalties.
George Cory
